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MONETARISM, FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY,
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Richard L. Cantrell

July 19, 1994
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Department of Economics

Western Kentucky University

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the period between
the fourth quarter of 1979 through the third quarter of 1982
with respect to Federal Reserve policy. This period is known
as the "Monetarist Experiment" because the Federal Reserve
announced that it would be adopting monetarist principles in
the implementation of its policy. Supporters of monetarism
claim that this was not a true monetarist experiment because
the Federal Reserve implemented policy incorrectly.
Using statistical and time-series regression analyses, I
address this question and conclude that the "Monetarist
Experiment" was nothing of the kind. Federal Reserve policy
never actually changed and monetary aggregates were not
affected
according to the principles of monetarism.
Furthermore, using regression techniques, I conduct a
simulation experiment using growth rates for the money supply
which are more in line with monetarist philosophies.
The
resulting GNP growth rates are much smoother and steadier over
time.
Had monetarism been tried, rather than the chaotic
money supply fluctuations that characterized the period, we
would likely have seen an economy characterized by greater
stability.
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Chapter One
Introduction and Review of Monetarism

This paper will represent a discussion of Federal Reserve
policy between 1979 and 1982.

This period is referred to as

the " Monetarist Experiment" because the Federal Reserve
announced that they would be following monetarist ideas with
respect to the implementation of policy.

It is the purpose in

this thesis to show that the policy was non-monetarist in its
implementation

because

Federal

Reserve

goals

were

never

altered to those of monetarists.
In terms of the literature we will be discussing three
major

areas.

The first is literature dedicated

to the

discussion of monetarism and its theoretical background.

The

second area is discussion of literature concerning opponents
of monetarism.

The third area is literature devoted to

discussion of the "Monetarist Experiment" itself.

What is Monetarism?

The basic idea of monetarism is that inflation is a
monetary phenomenon.

Changes in growth rates of money have

effects on changes in the rate of inflation.
1

Given this basic

2

idea, monetarists maintain that only a slow and steady rate
growth for the money supply, one which is in line with the
real rate of growth for the economy, can insure that the price
level will remain stable (Macesich 3).
The leading voice in monetarist Economics is that of
Milton Friedman.

In his years as a monetarist economist, he

has summarized the monetarist view on the relationship between
the growth rate of money and the price level:
1.

There is a constant, though not precise, relationship

between the rate of growth of the money supply and the rate of
growth of nominal income.
2.

This relationship is not obvious at first mostly because

there is a lag in the effect of a change in the growth rate of
the money supply to a change in the growth of nominal income.
3.

On average, a change in the growth rate of money produces

a change in the growth rate of nominal income on the order of
two to three quarters later.

This is, of course, on average

and is subject to the individual cases.
4.

The change in income shows up first in output, and almost

not at all in prices.
5.

On average, the effect on the price level shows up some

two to three quarters after the initial effect on income.
Therefore, the total delay between a change in the growth rate
of money and a change in the price level is approximately
twelve to eighteen months.
6.

Even after allowing for a delay in the effect of monetary

3

growth, the relationship is not perfect.

There can be slips

between the change in money and the change in income, possibly
because of slight shifts in money demand or velocity.
7.

In the short-run, money changes affect output primarily.

However, over the long-run, money changes affect primarily
prices (Macesich 3-4)
In short, monetarists believe that money and its rate of
growth have important impacts on short-run economic phenomena
such as inflation, output, and income.
Monetarism is typically identified with Milton Friedman,
and deservedly so; he has been one of the leading monetarist
economists in America for the better part of fifty years.
Therefore, we naturally consider him to be the leader of the
Chicago School of Economic Thought.

However, the foundations

for monetarist theory were in place long before Friedman.
Friedman

attributes

the

substantive

monetarist thought to Irving Fisher.

foundations

for

Fisher set forth the

idea of a quantity theory of money: that is, a relationship
between money and prices.

Obviously, the general idea that

money and prices are related is one of the oldest in the
history of economic thought.

However, the Quantity Theory of

Money states this idea in terms of mathematics.

Fisher

developed the quantity equation: MV=PT, money multiplied by
the constant velocity equals prices multiplied by the volume
of transactions.

Not only did Fisher present this equation,

he also applied it in various contexts.

Fisher maintained
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that fluctuations in economic activity were reflections of
changes in the quantity of money (Milton Friedman, Monetary
Economics 3).
In his book Appreciation and Interest
analyzed

the

rates

and

question

the

difference between nominal and real rates of interest.

His

inflation.2

relationship
This

between

(1876) Fisher

relationship

calls

interest
into

example is as follows: if you lend someone one-hundred pounds
today and in one year's time you receive one-hundred six
pounds, and in the meantime the price level rises by six
percent then your one-hundred six pounds will be worth onehundred pounds today.

The nominal rate of interest is six

percent but the real rate is zero.

Fisher also distinguished

between actual interest real rates, realized after the event,
and the anticipated real interest rate that
borrowers expect.

lenders and

This distinction is very important in

understanding the relationship between inflation and real
rates of interest.

If the expected rate of inflation is less

that six percent, then a lender might be willing to lend at
six percent because his anticipated real interest rate would
be greater than zero.

Similarly, if the expected rate of

inflation is greater than six percent, that same lender would
not be willing to lend at six percent because his anticipated
real interest rate would be less than zero.

This distinction

between actual real rates and anticipated real rates helps to
explain why inflation tends to linger once it has begun.

As

5

inflation accelerates, people come to expect it and build this
expected inflation into the interest rates they are willing to
pay or demand (Milton Friedman, Monetary Economics 3-4).
Now that we see that there is a relationship between
money

and

income

and,

furthermore,

between

money

and

inflation, we must now discuss monetarism with respect to
policy implementation.
monetary

What can public policy makers, both

and fiscal, learn from the study of monetarist

Economics?
First,

let

us

discuss

monetary

policy

as

a

tool.

Monetarism is associated with the idea that monetary policy is
the most effective tool at the disposal
Government.

of the

Federal

Monetary policy dominates fiscal policy in terms

of affecting the economy (Olsen 462).

In its most general

sense, the credo of the monetarists is that monetary policy is
much more effective in influencing aggregate demand and output
than is fiscal policy (Harris 429).
We now have one-half of the monetarist suggestion for
policy implementation.

Money matters and is relatively more

important than fiscal policy; we must affect changes in the
money supply.

The second question is "how?"

number of ways to affect the supply of money.

There are a
We can use the

yo-yo approach and bounce the growth rate of money up or down
as we see short-run changes in the economy (which has often
been typical of the Federal Reserve approach) or we can take
a different approach.
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Milton Friedman proposes that money matters and that
monetary policy dominates fiscal policy.

However, Friedman

has proposed how our policy may be implemented.

Instead of

the discretionary policy which the Federal Reserve uses,
Friedman suggest choosing an appropriate rate of growth for
the money supply and adhering to it.

With a steady rate of

growth of money we would see a steady growth in income,
output, and, eventually, inflation.

This is not to say that

we could perfectly predict income based on the growth of
money; however, with steady growth of money, inflation would
eventually

become

steady

and,

therefore,

inflation

expectations would be steady as well (Milton Friedman, Program
99-100). Given what was set forth by Irving Fisher concerning
the relationship
inflation

between expected

(Milton

Friedman,

inflation

Monetary

and

realized

Economics

3-4) ,

eliminating some uncertainty in expectations would lead to a
more stable economy, other things constant.

Monetarism vs. Non-Monetarism

There has always been a considerable debate over what
determines the levels and growth rates of nominal GNP, prices,
and unemployment.

Macroeconomics is concerned with these

variables and how we may use stabilization policy to make them
move

in

desirable

directions.

categories of stabilization policy:

There

are

three

major

7

1.

Monetary policy - using changes in the money supply
and interest rates

2.

Fiscal policy - using changes in government spending
and taxation

3.

A miscellaneous category of government policy
including wage-price controls or incomes policies.

The particular policy which one favors is related to which
underlying

theory

one

prefers

(Miller

and

Pulsinelli,

Macroeconomics 16-17).
Let

us first discuss the

Economic thought.
Maynard

Revolution"

in

This revolution is identified with John

Keynes and his

Employment.

"Keynesian

Interest,

19 3 6 book The General

and Money.

In this

Theory

book,

of

Keynes

criticizes earlier economic thinking (the classical model) on
empirical and theoretical grounds

(Miller and Pulsinelli,

Macroeconomics 128).
The most basic criticism

of monetary

policy by the

Keynesians has to do with the stability of money demand (or
velocity).

Classical economists (and monetarists) maintain

that the demand for money is relatively stable, meaning that
monetary policy will have a constant effect on the quantity of
money that is demanded.

However, Keynesians believe that

money demand is unstable and therefore monetary policy is
relatively ineffective, especially in periods of recession or
depression because profit expectations are already depressed
to the point where nominal interest rates are not affected by

8

a

change

in the money

supply

(Keynes

3 04-06) .

Keynes

maintains that monetary policy is ineffective because in his
demand for money function there is a flat portion of the
curve. What this money demand function says is that there may
be an interest rate that is low enough to cause people to hold
a limitless amount of money, and financial institutions are
prepared to sell bonds and hold excess reserves (Miller and
Pulsinelli, Macroeconomics 511-15).

Essentially, Keynesians

believe that, in a recessionary period, monetary policy cannot
even affect nominal interest rates, let alone GNP growth rates
or inflation, because of the perverse movements of money
demand or velocity.
Because the demand for money is not stable, we may be
faced with an unstable economy, contrary to what the classical
economists believe. Given our unstable economy, stabilization
policy must be used in order to correct the instability in the
economy. Because, according to Keynesians, monetary policy is
ineffective

in

terms

of

changing

the

economy

during

recessionary times, fiscal policy is the method by which
stabilization can occur.

Fiscal policy must be used whenever

aggregate demand is insufficient to absorb the current level
of GNP (Morgan 68).3
An important idea of the Keynesian model is the concept
of price/wage and interest rate inflexibility (the liquidity
trap).
rate

New Keynesians reject this idea of price and interest

instability.

Instead of agreeing with Keynes that

9

unemployment

can

exist

at

equilibrium

positions,

New

Keynesians refer to unemployment as a disequilibrium problem.
Unemployment is not a result of the rigidity of prices and
wages,

but

it

instantaneously

exists
to

their

because

prices

equilibrium

do

values

not

adjust

because

of

imperfect information (Harris 280).
With respect to policy, the New Keynesians differ from
Keynesians in that they find discretionary monetary policy, in
conjunction with appropriate fiscal policy, to be desirable.4
Fiscal policy is important to New Keynesians for the same
reason it is important to Keynesians —

to absorb current GNP

levels which cannot be absorbed by aggregate demand. However,
according to New Keynesians, monetary policy does have an
indirect effect on the price level through its effect on money
wages, and New Keynesians seek to use monetary policy to
exploit the relationship of the Phillips curve (Rousseas 77).
For these reasons, New Keynesians favor fiscal policy and
discretionary monetary policy in order to "fine-tune" the
economy.
The third non-monetarist school of thought consists of
those who favor the Rational Expectations Hypothesis.
short,

this

theory

says

that

because

expectations

In
are

rational, errors made in one period have no effect on errors
made

in

subsequent

periods

(Miller

and

Pulsinelli,

Macroeconomics 8).
With respect to policy, the theory simply states that no
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stabilization policy can affect systematic changes in output
and employment even in the short-run.

Because the errors

concerning inflation that people make are not correlated with
previous errors, the difference between expected inflation and
actual inflation is random.

Because these errors are random,

they cannot be affected in a systematic way and certainly
long-run unemployment and output will return to natural rates
(Harris 459).
Even

though

expectations

are

rational,

the

Federal

Reserve can attempt to "fool" people with respect to policy.
If

a

change

in

policy

(or

a

supply/demand

shock)

is

anticipated or announced then the economy remains at its
natural level of output (Miller and Pulsinelli, Macroeconomics
406) . However, the Federal Reserve can choose not to announce
a plan to increase (or decrease) the growth rate of the money
supply.

Given

this, there

concerning policy.

exists

imperfect

information

In the short-run, there can be some

unpredictable effect, but economic agents will already have
guessed a change in Federal Reserve policy and will have
incorporated
Federal

inflation

Reserve

into

policy

is

their

expectations

expansionary)

and

(assuming
output

and

unemployment will be unaffected. Because some economic agents
will have overestimated and some will have underestimated
inflation

the

employment

in

Federal
a

Reserve

systematic

Macroeconomics 407).

way

cannot

affect

(Miller

and

output

or

Pulsinelli,

In terms of policy implications, the
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Rational Expectationalists are not particularly far removed
from the monetarists.

The only difference between the two in

terms of stabilization policy is that monetarists specify the
growth rate of the money supply to be approximately equal to
the

natural

growth

rate

for

the

economy.

Rational

Expectationalists see that as a non-issue because, regardless
of the actions of the Federal Reserve, unemployment and output
will return to natural rates.5
Now that we have established what monetarism is and what
its major opponents in the arena of macroeconomics are, we
must attempt to settle the debate over monetary vs. fiscal
policy using empirical data applied to economic theory.

The

most well known and studied of these models is the AndersonJordan equation otherwise known as the St. Louis equation.

Revisiting Anderson-Jordan

The St. Louis equation was developed by two men, Leonall
Anderson and Jerry Jordan, while they were working in the
research department at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
(hence the St. Louis equation).

This equation is among the

most important and influential econometric models in modern
economic

thought

and has elicited

numerous

articles

and

criticisms over the last twenty plus years.
Let us start by discussing what the Anderson-Jordan model
(hereafter referred to as A-J) is and what it implies.

The
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equation is as follows:

1)

D

Y i

=

a

+
0

s

u

m

B

i

D m

+

i-i

s

u

m

G

i

D e

i-i

u

+

i

where y, m, and e denote nominal GNP, the money stock (Ml),
and

nominal

high-employment

government

expenditures,

respectively, and u denotes the usual random disturbance term.
It can be written more compactly as:

2)

Dy, = a0 + B (L) Dm1 + G (L) De1 + u,,

where B(L) and G(L) are polynomial distributed lags of order
k.

Anderson and Jordan choose k=3.

This lag structure means

that, in this model, the effects of monetary and fiscal policy
are constrained to lie on a polynomial of order three.

What

this equation says is that changes in nominal GNP are a
function of changes in the Ml money supply and changes in
government spending (Batten and Thornton 10).
The empirical results of A-J favored the monetarist
ideas.
while

The coefficients on Ml were positive and significant
the

coefficients

insignificant

at the

on

government

five percent

expenditures

level

of

were

significance

(Batten and Thornton 12) . Though there have been a number of
econometric criticisms of the A-J model, its structure is
still the blueprint for further econometric research in the
area of monetary vs. fiscal policy.6
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Given the Anderson-Jordan equation and its results, it
would appear that, in terms of policy implementation, monetary
policy, in our model, dominates fiscal policy with regards to
affecting nominal income.

These results might seem to put to

rest the ongoing debate. However, monetarism is not only that
money matters; we must also correctly target the money supply
and reach stable growth rates for that money.

The next

question in our discussion of monetarism is whether or not it
can work in practice.

The Monetarist Experiment

The

Federal

Reserve,

between

1970

and

1979,

was

attempting to control the money supply through the use of the
Federal Funds rate.

This period marks the beginning of the

"modern" era of Federal Reserve policy.

The Federal Reserve

chose a firm intermediate target for money supply growth and
attempted to reach that target through the use of Federal
Funds rate targeting.

The Federal Reserve was required to

forecast the position of the money demand schedule and deduce
what long term interest rate would be needed in order to meet
its intermediate target. The problem that the Federal Reserve
encountered was shifting money demand.

The forecasts for the

money demand schedule were inaccurate and that caused the
Federal Reserve to miss its intermediate target growth rate
for the money supply.

Eventually, the money stock began
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growing faster than what was consistent with intermediate
targets.

By

accelerated.

1979,

the

money

stock

and

inflation

had

This prompted the Federal Reserve to announce a

different strategy for policy implementation.

The Federal

Reserve would begin targeting non-borrowed reserves directly
(Miller and VanHoose 669-73).
This

change

in policy

marks

the

beginning

of

the

"Monetarist Experiment." This "Monetarist Experiment" lasted
through

the third quarter of 1982, exactly

three years.

Opponents of monetarism use the instability of the economy
during this period as a severe criticism of monetarism (Olsen
463-64).
Milton

Friedman

indicts

Federal

Reserve

policy

by

mentioning that during the experiment, the Federal Reserve
reverted to its old policy.

Despite its announcement to

change policy and target monetary aggregates, the Federal
Reserve began targeting the straight Federal Funds rate during
a brief period of time in the spring of 1980

("Monetary

Policy" 109).
Along

with

Milton

Friedman,

many

other

monetarists

criticize the Federal Reserve's policy during this period.
The instability of the growth rates of monetary aggregates
leads these critics of the Federal Reserve to conclude that
the Federal Reserve never really abandoned its commitment to
interest rate control.

If this is the case, the Federal

Reserve, despite its policy announcement, must forego control
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of monetary aggregates (Miller and Pulsinelli, Modern Money
and Banking 522).8
Critics

of the Federal Reserve's

policy

during

the

"Monetarist Experiment" were not restricted to the private
sector.

Before the end of the experiment, Larry Roos, the

president of the St. Louis Federal Reserve, made several
speeches complaining that the Open Market Committee was not
being faithful to the monetarist doctrine (Greider 390). This
criticism of Federal Reserve policy during the experiment is
particularly damaging because it was levied from within the
Federal Reserve itself.
Also, during the experiment, when the Federal Reserve
claimed to target the growth of the money supply, the discount
rate was also being targeted.

The Federal Reserve would have

a difficult time maintaining control of the money supply if
the discount rate (and later the Federal Funds rate) is also
targeted (Greider 216-18).
Furthermore, during 1980, the first full year of the
experiment, "money supply growth rose and fell like a yoyo. "(Greider 218)

The money supply was up 13% in February,

down 17% in April, up nearly 23% in August, and down 17% in
December. This pattern can be seen in interest rates as well.
Granted, during this experiment we see the Federal Reserve's
impact on the economy being as bizarre as the jumping interest
rates and money supply growth rates. This period showed short
gyrations from recession to recovery and back again (Greider
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218-19).

The volatility of the money supply growth rates are

yet another indication of the Federal Reserve's failure to
correctly implement monetarism.
Some Economists, however, do believe that the Federal
Reserve acted in good faith and began to target non-borrowed
reserves.

Michael Bradley and Dennis Jansen specify vector

auto-regressive models for the period before and during the
"Monetarist Experiment."
to

determine

whether

They estimate these models in order
there

were

different

patterns

influence among monetary variables in the two periods.

of

Their

findings favor the idea that the Federal Reserve had begun
targeting

non-borrowed

reserves because they

note marked

differences between the two periods with regards to the
influences
reserves,

of

monetary

during

interest rates.

the

policy

variables.

experiment,

no

longer

Non-borrowed
varied

with

In the views of Bradley and Jansen, the

Federal Reserve had changed policy (328-34).

Furthermore,

during the "Monetarist Experiment" the variability of the
Federal Funds rate increased to nearly twenty times what it
was between 1970 and 1979.

These two observations tend to

support the idea that the Federal Reserve was no longer
targeting the Federal Funds rate (Miller and VanHoose 678).
We see that the Federal Reserve may have abandoned its
commitment to interest rates and began targeting non-borrowed
reserves.

However, the Federal Reserve did not achieve their

targets for monetary aggregates. Many non-monetarists suggest
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that the Federal Reserve is simply unable to accurately target
the growth rate of the money supply.

These non-monetarists

maintain that non policy supply and demand-side factors make
attaining targeted money supply growth rates very difficult
(Bryant 6-7).

Because the Federal Reserve cannot explicitly

control the growth rate of the money supply, widening the
target range for the Federal Funds rate not only makes the
Federal Funds rate unstable, but makes the money supply growth
rate unstable as well (Mishkin 392-4) . This type of criticism
calls into question the practicality of monetarism as a guide
for policy.

If the Federal Reserve cannot explicitly control

the growth rate of the money supply, then a fixed-rate rule
for monetary policy is not achievable.
During a meeting of the American Economic Association in
December of 1983, Benjamin Friedman attacks the "Monetarist
Experiment" by citing numerous inconsistencies in economic
behavior with respect to the implementation of monetarist
principles in Federal Reserve policy.

First of all, he shows

that the monetary aggregates Ml, M2, and M3 did not move
together over the period between 1979 and 1982.

Between the

fourth quarter of 1979 and the fourth quarter of 1980, the Ml
growth rate moved from 7.4% to 7.2% while M2 and M3 growth
rates went from 8.1% to 9.0% and 9.6% to 9.7% respectively
during this period.

From 1980 to 1981, the Ml growth rate

dropped from 7.2% to 5.1% while M2 rose to 9.4% and M3 was up
to 11.7%.

In 1982, the Ml growth rate rose to 8.5% while the
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M2

and

M3

rates

rose

to

9.3%

and

10.1%

respectively.

According to the monetarist ideal, these aggregates should
move roughly in tandem.

Also, the movement of some monetary

aggregate should roughly explain the movement of the growth
rate of nominal GNP.

Friedman shows that the nominal GNP

growth rate went from 9.7% in 1979 to 9.3% in 1980 and to
10.8% in 1981.

These were years in which the growth rate of

Ml declined from 7.4% in 1979 to 5.1% in 1981. Also, in 1982,
the growth rate of GNP was 2.6% while the Ml growth rate was
at 8.5%.

These observations seem to be inconsistent with the

principles of monetarism (Benjamin Friedman 382-84).
These inconsistencies in GNP growth rates with respect to
monetary growth rates seem to add credibility to the idea that
monetarism did not work when the Federal Reserve used it as a
guide for policy implementation.
The obvious champion to whom I shall look for a rebuttle
of Benjamin
Friedman.

Friedman's criticisms

is, of

course,

Milton

Milton Friedman introduced a paper at the same

conference as Benjamin Friedman.

In this paper, Friedman

responds to the critics of monetarism.
With

regard

to the different movements

in monetary

aggregates, Friedman cites the confusion of labels.

The

aggregates, how they are currently defined, do not correspond
to those aggregates about which the claims by monetarists were
made.

The current M2 is much broader than the earlier M2.

It

is almost identical to the M4 aggregate compiled earlier by
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Friedman

and

Schwartz7.

The

Ml

measure

is

closer,

conceptually to the earlier M2 because it includes interest
bearing deposits.

Monetarists never recommended the use of

such broad aggregates as M2 and M3 as monetary targets.

The

closest approximations to those aggregates recommended are Ml
and the monetary base (Milton Friedman, "Lessons" 398).
On the question of movements in GNP growth with respect
to changes in a monetary aggregate growth, Friedman says that
a year is too long a time unit to use, especially between the
years 1980 through 1983 which were characterized by abnormally
short cyclical phases in the economy.

Monetarists attribute

these short cyclical phases to short and volatile gyrations in
monetary growth during this period of time. Also, monetarists
have concluded that nominal GNP growth lags behind Ml growth
some six months, on average.

Friedman cites swings in Ml and

nominal GNP one quarter later from 1978:4 to 1979:4 for Ml and
1979:1 to 1980:1 for nominal GNP.

Fluctuations in the two

measures move up and identically (although not in magnitude or
measure) in direction when the data is lagged one quarter
(Milton Friedman, "Lessons" 3 99) .
Milton

Friedman

takes

one

more

stab

at

the

anti-

monetarist. Although the opponents of monetarism refer to the
Federal Reserve policy during this time period as monetarist,
Friedman maintains that it was decidedly non-monetarist in its
implementation.

The

Federal

Reserve

claimed

to

target

monetary aggregates, but that is only part of a monetarist
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policy.

In

addition

to

targeting

explicitly

monetary

aggregates, the achievement of a steady and predictable rate
of growth in the aggregate is essential as well.
point, the Federal Reserve was decidedly

On this

anti-monetarist.

Friedman shows the simple standard deviation of quarter to
quarter monetary growth rates prior to October 1979 (1.59%)
and after October 1979 (5.64%).

The volatility of monetary

growth was higher in the three years of the experiment than it
was in any earlier three year period since World War II. This
volatility serves as a particularly strong refutation of antimonetarist claims that the Federal Reserve tried monetarism
and it did not work.

The Federal Reserve, in fact, did not

use a monetarist policy during the period of 1979 through 1982
(Milton Friedman, "Lessons" 399).
In his article "Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice"
(1982),

Friedman

refers

to Federal

function of "bureaucratic inertia."

Reserve

policy

as a

This is not in reference

only to the period of the experiment, but throughout the
history of the Federal Reserve.

The Federal Reserve fails to

correct mistakes despite its widespread recognition because
the Federal Reserve has no bottom line.

The Federal Reserve

has no budget constraint, it faces no voters, and once its
board members are appointed to a full term, they cannot be
reappointed.

In contrast, the private sector has a bottom

line, monetary losses. If this occurs, employees get fired or
demoted.

In government, this occurs to a smaller extent in
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that officials are subject to voter disenchantment

(114).

This lack of a bottom line is why the Federal Reserve is able
to make mistakes in policy and can continue to make those same
mistakes, like the failure during the experiment, without
retribution.
From a political standpoint, it is very difficult to
implement a change in policy which is designed to reduce
inflation.

There was a desire to quell inflationary trends

but at the same time avoid policies which might lead to
recession.
reserves

The Federal Reserve's policy of targeting bank

is referred

to as

"monetarist."

However,

the

political desires to avoid any recessionary trend made for an
environment which was hardly conducive to the monetarist
fixed-growth rule (Olsen 468) .
Critics of monetarism named the Federal Reserve policy of
1979-82 the "Monetarist Experiment."

These critics maintain,

however, that it could never be monetarist enough to satisfy
the purists of the monetarist community (Olsen 468).

This

particular criticism of monetarism is unfounded because there
is no gray area in monetarist theory.

The monetarist theory

is very specific in terms of suggestions for policy.

The

simple fact that money supply growth rates were extremely
volatile during the experiment gives rise to suspicion that
the Federal Reserve did not implement monetarism.

Critics of

monetarism, while trying to emphasize the Federal Reserves
inability to control non-borrowed reserves, unwittingly give
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strength to the argument that Federal Reserve policy was not
monetarist by highlighting volatile money supply growth during
the period.

It must be emphasized that volatile money supply

growth rates and a Federal Reserve policy which is monetarist
are mutually exclusive events.

Overview of Thesis

Given that there has been considerable debate over the
reference to this period of time as a monetarist experiment,
there is sufficient evidence given by monetarists to examine
this period of time and determine if it was an experiment in
monetarism.
reasonable

It has been suggested that there is, at least,
doubt

that the Federal Reserve

abandoned

its

previous policy of targeting interest rates and began to
target monetary aggregates.

However, whether or not the

Federal Reserve abandoned its commitment to interest rates is
not as important as the ultimate goal of policy.
As we shall see, not only is there some doubt that the
Federal Reserve changed the intermediate target of its policy,
but there is some doubt as to whether or not the Federal
Reserve changed the goal of its policy.

In the next chapter,

we will look at the "Monetarist Experiment" from an empirical
point of view.

We will discuss the issue of changes in

Federal Reserve policy and also examine the true goals of
Federal Reserve policy.

Chapter Two
An Empirical Look at the
Monetarist Experiment

Because of the instability in the economy during the
period of the "Monetarist Experiment," anti-monetarists have
hailed

the

period

as

a

failure

of

monetarism,

while

monetarists have maintained that the principles of monetarism
were never implemented by the Federal Reserve with regards to
policy.

In

the

first

chapter,

we

saw

that

there

compelling arguments on either side of the issue.

are

In this

chapter, we will begin to explore this issue from a purely
empirical standpoint.

Was it Monetarism?

As we have discussed in the first chapter, there are two
major components of a monetarist policy.

First, the growth

rate of the money supply should be the intermediate target of
macro-economic policy. Instead of trying to affect changes in
the economy by using fiscal policy, the Federal Government
should use monetary policy.

Second, not only is it important

to target monetary aggregates, but it is also imperative that
23
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these aggregates grow in a steady fashion, one which is in
line with the natural growth of the economy.

Furthermore,

monetarism is concerned with long term macroeconomic goals
such as stable inflation or increased GNP growth.

In order to

implement monetarism, the Federal Reserve must have a clear
macroeconomic

goal,

that

is,

stabilized

inflation.

A

monetarist policy requires this goal; therefore, the actual
intermediate target is unimportant since the Federal Reserves
tool (monetary policy) never changes.

In other words, the

Federal Reserve targets the money supply whether directly,
through non-borrowed reserve targeting, or indirectly, through
Federal Funds rate targeting (Wallich 23).
Now that we have established the criteria for identifying
a monetarist policy, we can look simply at the numbers from
this period and draw our own conclusions.

Was it a failure of

monetarism, or merely a failure of policy?
Initially,

let us assume

that,

consistent

with

its

announcement, the Federal Reserve began targeting monetary
aggregates in order to stabilize inflation in the fourth
quarter of 1979. Given this assumption (which we will see can
be questioned), the Federal Reserve needs only to insure slow,
steady growth in the money supply in order to meet monetarist
criteria.

Let us look at the numbers.

First, we need to determine which monetary aggregate we
are going to use for our empirical test.

We chose the Ml

monetary aggregate for two reasons: 1) the Federal Reserve has
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more control over that aggregate than over more comprehensive
aggregates like M2 or M3 because Ml is influenced to a greater
extent by the monetary base and, 2) Anderson and Jordan used
the Ml aggregate in their St. Louis equation9.
Now that we have our monetary aggregate, let us look at
the descriptive statistics of the growth rate of Ml in the
period between the fourth quarter of 1976 and the third
quarter of 1979 (the three years just before the experiment) .
The sample mean of this series is .0207046 in decimal form and
the sample standard deviation of this series is .0067743. Now
we can compare those numbers with the descriptive statistics
of this series during the experiment.

Between the fourth

quarter of 1979 and the third quarter of 1982, we find that
the mean changed some

(it was .0151898) but the standard

deviation grew from .0067743 to .0162607 (see Tables 2.1 and
2.2 for statistical output)10.

There is enough evidence in

just these sample descriptive statistics to warrant further
study.

The fact that the standard deviation is 2.4 times as

large during the experiment gives us some idea that monetary
growth rates became unstable during this period.
This point is shown graphically in Figure 2.1.

Figure

2.1 shows quarterly growth rates for the Ml aggregate from
1962 through

the third

quarter

of

1982.

The

graphical

representation shows visually the instability of the series
over

the time

1982.3).

period

of

the

experiment

(1979.4

through

As we can see, growth rates were not particularly

Table 2.1

Descriptive Statistics for
the Growth Rate of Ml
Sample Range 1976.4 through 1979.3
Number of Observations - 12
Variable
DM1

Mean
.0207046

Standard Deviation
.0067743

Max
.0344314

Min
.007735

Table 2.2

Sample Range 1979.4 through 1982.3
Number of Observations - 12
Variable
DM1

Mean
.0151898

Standard Deviation
.0162607
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Max
.0565691

Min
-.0028413

Quarterly growth r a t e s of t h e Ml m o n e y supply (DMl) over t h e period
1962.1 t h r o u g h 1982.3
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stable in the years before the experiment.

If this had been

a truly monetarist experiment, we would expect to see a series
that is more, not less, stable.
In

addition

to

simple

visual

investigation

of

the

standard deviations for the Ml growth rate series, it is
necessary that we conduct a statistical test on the variances
of the two time periods in question. Our test is an F-test on
the ratio of variances. We set our null hypothesis to be that
the true variance of the series DMl over the experiment period
is less than or equal to the variance of the series DMl over
the three years before the experiment.

Our test statistic is

5.7616865 and our critical value is 2.82

(Gujarati 682).

Because our test statistic is greater than our critical value,
we must reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the
variance of our series DMl is higher over the period of the
experiment (1979.4 through 1982.3) than it was over the three
years prior to the experiment.11
Given this evidence, we must conclude that the Federal
Reserve did not strive for a stable rate of monetary growth.
Therefore, this experiment was decidedly non-monetarist in its
implementation, and we cannot conclude that it is a failure of
monetarism.

Was Policy Really Changed?

Now that we have concluded that the experiment conducted
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between the fourth quarter of 1979 and the third quarter of
1982 was not a monetarist experiment, we must now challenge an
assumption made earlier in this chapter —
Reserve changed its ultimate goal.

that the Federal

In essence, we must

examine the idea that the Federal Reserve changed policy and
began to target non-borrowed reserves in order to stabilize
inflation.
Prior

to

the

experiment,

the

Federal

Reserve

used

discretionary monetary policy as a means to an end.

The

Federal Reserve used policy that was designed to exploit the
Phillips curve and target the unemployment rate with the rate
of inflation being a secondary issue.

The Federal Reserve

supposedly changed its policy and began targeting monetary
aggregates

in

order

to

stabilize

inflation,

unemployment rate a secondary issue.

making

the

In order to test this

proposition, we must determine a relationship between monetary
growth

and the civilian unemployment rate.

Reserve, except during the experiment, would
monetary policy to try to control unemployment.

The

Federal

try to use
It is at this

point that our money reaction function begins.
A money reaction function is a model that is designed to
demonstrate the reaction of monetary policy to changes in some
other macroeconomic phenomenon. In this model we will examine
the reaction of monetary policy to changes in the civilian
unemployment rate (see Figure 2.2).

However, during the time

period of the experiment, we would not expect to see

U n e m p l o y m e n t Rate (URATE) a n d Growth Rate of Ml (PMl)
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changes in the civilian unemployment rate to have any effect
on the growth of money because, according to the Federal
Reserve,

inflation

control

via

influence

aggregates was its main objective.

over

monetary

Our reaction function is

as follows:

DMlt = a0 + a1DMlt.1 + a2URATEt ., + a3UD + a4UD2 + ut

where DMl is the growth rate of the Ml money aggregate, URATE
is the civilian unemployment rate (%) , UD is the civilian
unemployment rate lagged one quarter multiplied by a dummy
variable which equals one in quarters 1979.4 through 1982.3,
and

zero in all other periods; and UD2

is the civilian

unemployment rate lagged one quarter multiplied by a dummy
variable which equals one in quarters 1982.4 through 1988.4,
and zero in all periods before and during the experiment.
This equation says that the growth rate of Ml in period t is
influenced by the growth rate of Ml in period t-1, the
civilian unemployment rate in period t-1, and our interactive
terms.
The important parts of this money reaction function are
the interactive terms — the dummy variables multiplied by the
lagged unemployment rate.

Because we have specified the

variables as we have, we should expect to see the first
interactive

term

(UD)

have

a

significantly

negative

coefficient if the Federal Reserve changed policy during the
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experiment.

Similarly, we should see the second interactive

term have a significant positive coefficient if policy was
changed during the experiment and then changed back after the
experiment.

The significance of these terms would imply that

the unemployment rate became less important to the Federal
Reserve during the experiment.

If policy was not changed, the

first interactive (UD) term would be insignificant because the
effect of a lagged value of the unemployment rate was not
altered during the experiment period.

Similarly, if the

second interactive term (UD2) is insignificant, then policy
after the experiment, with regards to unemployment, would not
have been changed.
Because the Federal Reserve claimed to change policy, we
would expect that our money reaction function will show this
change in policy.

However, that is not the case.

The

coefficients on the lagged unemployment rate terms and the
lagged Ml growth rate term are significant at the five percent
level.

The coefficients on our interactive terms, however,

are not significant even at the 69 and 29 percent levels,
respectively (see Table 2.5 for the output for this regression
and

Augmented

stationarity).

Dickey-Fuller

test

on

Ml

growth

rate

These insignificant values indicate that no

detectable change took place in the relationship

between

lagged unemployment and monetary policy during the experiment
nor

after

the

experiment.

These

findings

force

seriously reconsider the claims by the Federal Reserve

us

to

Table 2.5

Money Reaction Function Equation
Sample Range 1962.1 through 1988.4
Number of Observations - 108
Dependent Variable - DMl
Variable

Coefficient

C
DMl (-1)
URATE (-1)
UD
UD2

Std. Error

T-Stat

2-Tail Sicf.

0035741
0946701

.2903164
2 . 2576137
3 . 0899200
-.3923018
1. 0433198

.7722

0010376
2137285
0018910
0001733
0003868

R
Adj . R2
Regression S.E.
Log Likelihood
Durbin-Watson

0006120

0004418
0003707

.181253
.149457
.009543
351.7234
1.970805

. 0261
. 0026

. 6956
.2992

Mean of Dep. Variable
.015688
S.D. of Dep. Variable
.010348
Sum of Squared Residuals .009380
F-Statistic
5.700515
Prob(F-Statistic)
.000348

Stationarity Test for
the Growth Rate of Ml
Sample Range 1962.1 through 1988.4
Number of Observations - 108
Augmented Dickey-Fuller: UROOT(C,0) DMl
Dickey-Fuller t-statistic
MacKinnon critical values: 1%
5%
10%
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-7.4627
-3.4917
-2.8882
-2.5808
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concerning
experiment.

the

objectives of monetary

policy

during

the

Not only were monetary aggregates not stabilized

during this period, we also have found that policy goals were
never changed.
The Federal Reserve was still seeking solutions to shortrun macroeconomic problems.

Instead of allowing the economy

to proceed with only steady monetary growth, the Federal
Reserve

persisted

in discretionary,

reactionary

monetary

policy.

We must conclude that the period referred to as the

"Monetarist Experiment" was nothing more than the Federal
Reserve

continuing

policy

resembled true monetarism.

as

before

and

that

it

never

Chapter Three
Modelling a Monetarist Experiment

Constructing a Proper Model

In the past two chapters, we have discussed the Federal
Reserve "Monetarist Experiment" and have concluded, based on
empirical results, that it was not monetarism in any usual
sense of the term.

In fact, we have shown that the objectives

of Federal Reserve policy never changed during the period in
question.

The next step is to conduct a "what if?" monetarist

experiment and simulate nominal GNP growth rates over the
period of the fourth quarter of 1979 through the third quarter
of 1982.
In order to begin our experiment, we must construct an
econometric model which adequately explains GNP growth in
terms of monetary growth.

As we have seen, the Anderson-

Jordan equation is the bench-mark model for this relationship
and will be the basis for building a model for our experiment.
First, we must list all variables which will be used in
our model building and subsequent simulation experiment. They
are as follows:
Ml

-

The Ml money stock in billions of dollars (SAAR)
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GOVEX -

Federal Government expenditures in billions of
dollars (SAAR)

Y

-

Gross National Product, total, in billions of
dollars (SAAR)

DM1

-

Growth rate of the Ml money stock

DGOV

-

Growth rate of Federal Government Expenditures

DGNP

-

Growth rate of nominal Gross National Product

Each variable is quarterly data from the first quarter of 1961
through the fourth quarter of 198812.
For our estimation of a regression equation, I have
chosen DGNP, DM1, and DGOV.

DM1 is a proxy for monetary

policy by the Federal Reserve and DGOV is a proxy for fiscal
policy by the Federal Government.
Our theoretical relationship is that GNP growth should be
a function of money supply growth and government expenditure
growth.

A linear regression equation will look similar to

this:

DGNPt = a0 + a1DMlt.2 + a2DGOVt_2 + ut

where DGNP is our growth rate of GNP, DM1 is the growth rate
of the Ml money stock, DGOV is the growth rate of Federal
Government expenditures, and u is the usual random disturbance
term.

It must be noticed that both explanatory variables are

lagged two quarters,
economic theory.

considered consistent with monetarist

In chapter one, we discussed the monetarist
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view as set forth by Milton Friedman13.

In his view, there is

a lagged effect of six months between a change in money supply
growth and a change in nominal GNP growth.

We specify our

econometric model in this fashion in order to assure that it
is well-grounded in economic theory.
In order to use variables in a time-series model such as
this, it is necessary that the individual series be stationary
(mean reverting)

over time.

The best way

to test

the

stationarity of a time series is by using the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller test.

Micro-TSP does this test automatically

and produces the outputs.
Let us look first at the series DGNPDickey-Fuller t-statistic is -6.865 —

As we can see, our

sufficiently large (in

absolute value) to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root
(non-stationarity); therefore, we conclude that the series is
stationary over our sample period (1962.1 through 1979.3).
The same is true for the series DMl and DGOV.

The Dickey-

Fuller t-statistics are -5.4521 and -8.2957, respectively,
both of which are large enough (in absolute value) to reject
the null hypothesis of a unit root at the five percent level
of significance (see output for DMl, DGOV and DGNP in Table
3.1).
Now that we have our functional relationship and our
variables, we estimate a linear regression equation.

We

initially estimate an equation with a number of different lags
for each explanatory variable.

The only significant

Table 3.1

Stationarity Test for
the Growth Rates of GNP, Ml
and Federal Government Expenditures
Sample Period 1962.1 through 1979.3
Number of Observations - 71

Augmented Dickey-Fuller: UROOT(C,0) DGNP
Dickey-Fuller t-statistic
MacKinnon critical values:

1%
5%
10%

-6.8650
-3.5239
-2.9023
-2.5882

Augmented Dickey-Fuller: UROOT(C,0) DM1
Dickey-Fuller t-statistic
1%
5%
10%

-5.4521
-3.5239
-2.9023
-2.5882

Augmented Dickey-Fuller: UROOT(C,0) DGOV
Dickey-Fuller t-statistic
1%
5%
10%
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-8.2957
-3.5239
-2.9023
-2.5882
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coefficient is that on the second lag of the Ml growth rate
(DMl(-2)).

This finding is consistent with theory, since the

effect of a change in money is shown to have a six month (two
quarter) lagged effect

(see Table 3.2 for the regression

output).
Because we find that the coefficients on all of the
government expenditure variables are insignificant at the five
percent level, we must test for exclusion restrictions.

More

specifically, in this model, we must test to see if all the
coefficients on government expenditure are jointly equal to
zero.
from

To do so, we first obtain the sum of squared residuals
our

initial

regression

(.004570).

Then

we

run a

restricted regression (one which leaves out the variables on
government

expenditures)

and

obtain

the

sum

of

squared

residuals from that regression (see Table 3.3 for the output
of this regression).
coefficients

The value we obtain is .004916.

If the

on the government expenditure variables

are

jointly equal to zero, the sum of squared residuals should not
change when we run our restricted regression. We calculate an
F-statistic for this test which is equal to 1.6404085.14
If this number is larger than our critical F value, we
will reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the
three government expenditure variables are jointly equal to
zero.

At the five percent significance level, we find in the

F-table that the critical value is 2.76

(Gujarati

682).

Because our calculated F-statistic is less than our critical

Table 3.2

Initial (Unrestricted) Model Estimation for
the Growth Rate of GNP
Sample Range 1962.1 through 1979.3
Number of Observations - 71
Dependent Variable - DGNP
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

C
.0086173
DMl(-l)
.2344976
DM1(-2)
.6533872
DGOV
.0803978
DGOV(-l) .0513824
DGOV(-2) -.0761785
R2
Adj . R2
Regression S.E.
Log Likelihood
Durbin-Watson

•

308167
254949
008385
241.8638
2. 031513

0032219
1529078
1566585
0516727
0514467
0520677

T-Stat

2-Tail Siq.
. 0095
. 1300
. 0001
. 1246
. 3216
. 1483

2.6746107
1.5335885
4.1707749
1.5559037
.9987503
-1.4630665

.021576
Mean of Dep. Variable
.009714
S.D. of Dep. Variable
Sum of Squared Residuals - 004570
F-statistic
5 . 790650
. 000176
Prob(F-statistic)
Table 3.3

Final (Restricted) Model Estimation for
the Growth Rate of GNP
Sample Range 1962.1 through 1979.4
Number of Observations - 71
Dependent Variable - DGNP
Variable
C
DM1(-1)
DM1(-2)

Coefficient

Std. Error

0100249
2740664
6021313

R
Adj . R2
Regression S.E.
Log Likelihood
Durbin-Watson

.255749
.233859
.008503
239.2712
2.091816

0026753
1539737
1567026

T-Stat.
3.7539609
1.7799555
3.8425106

2-Tail Siq,
0004
0796
0003

Mean of Dep. Variable
.021576
S.D. of Dep. Variable
.009714
Sum of Squared Residuals .004916
F-statistic
11.68352
Prob(F-statistic)
.000043
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value, we must fail to reject the null hypothesis and conclude
that the coefficients on DGOV, DGOV(-l), and DG0V(-2) are
jointly equal to zero.

This result leaves the restricted

regression to serve as our final model.
Our findings during this test are not unlike the findings
of Anderson and Jordan.

They concluded that the coefficients

on government expenditure were not significant with respect to
affecting GNP growth. Similarly, in our linear model, we must
reach the same conclusion.

Since no single coefficient on

government expenditure was significant and they were all
jointly insignificant, we must conclude that fiscal policy is
ineffective in influencing the growth of nominal income (GNP)
— thereby leaving us with a very simple, but effective, model
for conducting our monetarist experiment (See Figure 3.1 for
a graphical representation of the relationship between DGNP
and DMl).

Diagnostics of Our Model

Now that we have a simple linear model with which to
conduct our experiment, it is important that we run a series
of diagnostic tests on this model to insure that there are no
inherent statistical problems within the model. Since we have
already tested the two time series variables for stationarity,
we need not cover that again; instead, we can look at the
model itself.

Quarterly growth r a t e s for GNP (DGNP) and Ml (DMl) over t h e period
1962.1 t h r o u g h 1979.3
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The first, and most obvious, test to perform is a t-test
for the significance of the coefficients on the DM1 (-1) and
DM1(-2) variables.

From our statistical output, we find that

the t-statistic on our DM1(-1) coefficient is 1.7799555.

The

value called 2-tailed significance gives us the significance
level at which we can reject the null hypothesis that the
coefficient equals zero.
reject

the

null

significance.
3.8425106.

Since this value is .0796, we can

hypothesis

at

a

7.9

percent

level

of

The t-statistic on our DM1(-2) coefficient is

The 2-tailed significance gives us .0003, meaning

that we can reject the null hypothesis at the .03 percent
level of significance (Newbold and Bos 88).
Our second diagnostic test is the F-test which tests the
overall significance of the model.

The outcome of this test

should not be different from the t-test, and indeed it is not.
Our F-statistic from the statistical output is 11.68352.

The

number just below the F-statistic on the regression output is
the level of significance at which we can reject the null
hypothesis that the model is insignificant overall.
number

is

.000043,

significance level.

which

is

far

below

any

This

relevant

Therefore we are able to reject the null

hypothesis and conclude that the model is significant overall
(Newbold and Bos 89-90).
Since this is a time series model, we must be aware of
the

problem

autocorrelation.

of

first-order

serial

correlation

or

Autocorrelation occurs when the residuals
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from the model are not independent of one another —

that is,

that the error in one period may influence the errors in
future periods.15
A standard test for autocorrelation is called the DurbinWatson

test

(the Durbin-Watson

statistic

appears

in the

statistical output) . The null hypothesis of this test is that
there is no autocorrelation.

We have our Durbin Watson test

statistic (2.091816), and now we need a critical value.

When

we use the Durbin-Watson table, we find that there are two
values for each number of observations and degrees of freedom.
If the calculated Durbin-Watson statistic is above the upper
limit

test

statistic,

hypothesis.

then we

fail

to

reject

the

null

In our case (with two degrees of freedom and 71

observations) our Durbin-Watson lower limit is 1.554 and our
upper limit is 1.672.

Because our calculated test statistic

is above the upper limit, we must fail to reject the null
hypothesis and conclude that there is no evidence of firstorder

serial

correlation

in the

residuals

of

our

model

(Newbold and Bos 100-02).
The only diagnostic of the model itself which is left to
examine is the R2 value.16

In our model, R2 is .255749, which

means that only twenty-five percent of the variation in DGNP
is explained by our regression.

However, this is a simple

regression model and it is able to explain twenty-five percent
of the variation in the dependent variable.

Considering all

those variables that the Federal Reserve cannot control and
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that may affect the growth of nominal GNP, this model says
that twenty-five percent of nominal growth is a function of
the growth rate of the money supply.
Now that we have our model, we can begin to make our
predictions for the time period of the experiment. With these
predictions we can make comparisons between true monetarism
and the policy in which the Federal Reserve actually was
engaged.

Results From the Simulation

Now that we have determined our model to be adequate and
statistically sound, we can begin to make some predictions
with it. The first predictions we estimate are those from the
period of the fourth quarter of 1979 through the third quarter
of 1982. This period is, of course, the period of the Federal
Reserve "Monetarist Experiment."

Because our simulation is a

"what if?" model, we must substitute the observed growth rates
of the money supply with manufactured growth rates which are
more consistent with monetarist

ideas.

To perform

this

simulation, we use numbers from a normally distributed random
variable with a mean of 3.5 and a standard deviation of
.0072842 (the standard deviation of the original series DMl
over the period 1962.1 through 1979.3).

We use this normally

distributed variable as a proxy for those elements of the
growth rate of the Ml money supply which cannot be explicitly
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controlled by the Federal Reserve.

We chose the mean of our

Ml growth rate to be 3.5 percent because Milton Friedman
specified that the growth rate should be between 3.5 and 4
percent (Program 100), and this number seems to be in line
with the long-term growth rate of the United States economy.
Furthermore, a random error term (et) is included which is a
randomly generated variable with a mean of zero and a standard
deviation equal to that of the series DGNP over the sample set
(.009714).

This error term serves as a proxy for endogenous

determinates of the growth rate of GNP which are not under the
control of the Federal Reserve.
Now that we have our simulated values for the growth rate
of Ml and our error term, we can substitute them into the
regression equation which is written as

DGNPt = .0127125 + .2740664 (DMlt.1) + . 6021313 (DMlt.2) + et

to get our predicted values for the growth rate of GNP (YDOT).
Let us first make some simple comparisons between our
simulated values and our observed values over the test period.
The observed mean over the period is .0184467 with a standard
deviation of .0156911.

The simulated mean is .0413731 with a

standard deviation of .0067551 (See Table 3.4).

From simple

visual examination, we see that the simulation experiment
yielded GNP growth rates which were not only higher, on
average, but were also more stable (the standard deviation was
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2.32 times as small).

A graphical representation of this

relationship can be found in Figure 3.2.
Given these results for our simulation, we can take these
predictions farther.

Let us look at predictions from this

model over a larger time period.

Since our data sets are

quarterly through 1988, we can compare predictions to observed
values

through

this

time

period

representation, see Figure 3.3).

(for

a

graphical

Over the time period of

1979.4 through 1988.4, we see an observed mean growth rate of
.0183889 with a standard deviation of .0103227.

Compare that

to a simulated growth rate mean of .0412880 and standard
deviation of .0072417 (See Table 3.5).

We can see that, even

over a longer period of time, stable money growth leads to a
more stable growth of nominal income.
Now that we have our predictions, we need to make sure
that

these

predictions

associated with them.

have

some

degree

of

reliability

First of all, we must look at the

within-sample predictions (YSTAT) of the model.

A graphical

comparison of these and observed values can be found in Figure
3.4.

We must compare our predictive model to the naive

forecast (that is, a one step ahead forecast).

If our model

does not predict GNP growth rates better that the naive
forecast, we cannot be confident in our simulated predictions.
Our test uses the Theil Inequality Coefficient (Theil's U)17.
If our model does not predict as well as the naive forecast,
then our U will be greater than one; if it predicts as well as

Predicted v a l u e s for t h e growth r a t e of GNP (YDOT) a n d observed v a l u e s
f o r t h e GNP growth r a t e (DGNP) d u r i n g t h e "Monetarist E x p e r i m e n t "

1980

1981

1982

DGNP

YDOT

Quarterly p r e d i c t i o n s f o r t h e growth r a t e of GNP (YDOT) a n d q u a r t e r l y
observed v a l u e s for GNP growth (DGNP) 1979.4 t h r o u g h 1988.4

DGNP

YDOT

Quarterly static f o r e c a s t s for t h e growth r a t e of n o m i n a l GNP (YSTAT)
a n d observed v a l u e s for GNP growth (DGNP) w i t h i n s a m p l e 1962.1-1979.3

YSTAT

DGNP
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the naive forecast, U will equal one; and if it predicts
better than the naive forecast, U will be less than one.
Micro-TSP calculates Theil's U for us.

Please see Table 3.6

for Micro-TSP output of the Theil's U. As we can see, Theil's
U for our within sample forecasts is equal to .181867 which is
less than one.

Therefore, we can say that our model predicts

better than the naive forecast.
Because we have concluded that our model is adequate and
our predictions are reliable, we must examine the implications
this has in terms of evaluating monetarism and subsequent
policy decisions.
implications.

In Chapter Four we will discuss these

Table 3.4

Descriptive Statistics for
Actual GNP Growth (DGNP) and
Simulated GNP Growth (YDOT)
Sample Period 1979.4 through 1982.3
Number of Observations - 12
Variable
DGNP
YDOT

Mean
0184467
0413731

Standard Deviation
.0156911
. 0067551

Max

Mm

.0434610
.0546058

0031962
0304660

Table 3.5

Sample Period 1979.4 through 1988.4
Number of Observations - 3 7
Variable
DGNP
YDOT

Mean
0183889
0412880

Standard Deviation
. 0103227
.0072417

Max

Mm

. 0434610
.0562357

0031962
0287029

Table 3.6

Theil U Test on
Within Sample Forecasts
Forecast Series - YSTAT
Forecast Evaluation - 71 Observations
Root Mean Squared Error
Mean Absolute Error
Mean Absolute Percentage Error
Theil Inequality Coefficient
Bias Proportion
Variance Proportion
Covariance Proportion
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.008321
.006541
45.18691
.181867
1.88E-17
.328271
.671729

Chapter Four
Policy Implications and Conclusions

Policy Implications

Given these results from our simulation experiment, what
implications can this have for Federal Reserve policy?

We

have observed nominal GNP growth rates which are unstable over
the entire period
observed

unstable

(1962.1 through 1988.4).
monetary
the

growth

period

over

called

We have also
the

the

period,

particularly

over

"Monetarist

Experiment."

Now, given our statistical model, we see a

relationship between money supply growth and nominal GNP
growth.

Because we understand this relationship, we can

expand our interpretation of our statistics to say that since
there is a positive relationship between money supply growth
and nominal GNP growth, we can also say that there is a
relationship between monetary instability and GNP instability.
What does this tells us about the objectives of Federal
Reserve policy?
The goal of monetary stabilization policy
insure steady growth of nominal income.

is not to

It is, instead, to

target short term macroeconomic phenomena such as unemployment
and nominal interest rates.

There are some serious problems
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with this type of policy.

The obvious problem

is that

stabilization policy ignores the growth of the entire economy.
By targeting only the unemployment rate, the Federal Reserve
ignores the importance of stable GNP growth.

Another problem

with this type of policy is that short-term macroeconomic
variables are controlled only in the nominal sense.

Long-run

rates of real GNP growth or unemployment cannot be controlled
by the Federal Reserve.

By trying to control macroeconomic

variables in the short-run, the Federal Reserve is likely to
forego long-term economic stability.
In terms of policy, the Federal Reserve, in order to
conduct

a

true

monetarist

experiment,

must

abandon

the

attempted exploitation of the Phillips curve and seek to
insure a stable rate of growth for the economy through stable
money supply growth.

Short-run fluctuations

in monetary

growth lead to fluctuations in the growth of nominal income.
This

leads

to

unstable

expectations

of

inflation

and

instability in the economy.

Conclusions

The Federal Reserve announced, in 1979, that they would
be implementing monetarist principles with regards to monetary
policy.

This experiment lasted from the fourth quarter of

1979 through the third quarter of 1982. Because this period
was

characterized

by

economic

instability,

opponents

of
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monetarism labeled the experiment as a failure of monetarism.
As the results of this paper have shown, this experiment was
decidedly

non-monetarist

in

its

implementation

because

monetary aggregates showed unstable growth and the objectives
of

Federal

Reserve

policy

never

changed.

Therefore,

monetarism is not dead, as opponents of monetarism believe, or
want to believe. In fact, this Federal Reserve experiment has
served only to strengthen the monetarist position.
We have discussed the principles of monetarism at length
throughout this paper.

We know that monetarists recommend

steady growth rates for the money supply to insure steady
growth of nominal income.

We also know that fiscal policy is

ineffective in terms of changing nominal income; in other
words, money matters.
To expound upon the most important aspect of monetarism,
that is steady growth of money, what does that really mean for
policy?

Monetarists do not say that the Federal Reserve

should indiscriminately change growth rates for money just
because money matters.

In fact, in it's most basic sense,

monetarism says to leave the economy alone and allow it to
function.

Simply allow the money supply to grow at a steady

rate, one which is in line with the long-run growth rate of
the economy.

Monetarism is not a recipe for implementing

discretionary monetary policy in order to affect short-run
changes in macroeconomic variables.

Rather, monetarism is

reaffirmation of the idea that markets work without outside
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interference. Similar to Rational Expectations, monetarism is
a philosophy which is in favor of limiting policy, both
monetary and fiscal, such that the economy is allowed to
adjust for economic phenomena on its own, without interference
from policy-makers who are concerned with the short-run.18
In its most basic sense, monetarism is a reaffirmation of
everything that free-market Economists believe.

Because the

economy is dependent on the expectations of market players,
stability of those expectations is of paramount importance
with respect to maintaining a stable economy.

Economists

maintain that these expectations are rational and that markets
work efficiently and can adjust, on their own, to changes in
macroeconomic conditions.

If this is true, then short-run

stabilization is not only unnecessary, but potentially harmful
because it can alter short-run expectations and disrupt the
efficiency

of

markets.

stabilization and

Those

who

favor

discretionary

"fine-tuning" of the economy must have

doubts about the efficiency of markets and the rationality of
market participants.
Monetarism

is an important

component

of

Capitalism.

Monetarists reject short-run stabilization and interference
with free markets in favor of long-run stability
economy

based

on

a

stable

rate

of

inflation

of the
and

the

rationality of market participants and their expectations.

Notes

1.

Macesich lists an abridged version of the monetarist
view set forth by Milton Friedman in his essay "Counter
Revolution in Monetary Theory, 1991."

2.

Friedman sets forth Fisher's examples and refers to him
as the greatest American Economist (Monetarist
Economics. 3-4).

3.

Keynes admits that in inflationary periods, contraction
of the money supply through stricter reserve requirements
could have an impact on interest rates and nominal income
(Miller and Pulsinelli 187-188).

4.

The New Keynesians during the 1970's seemed to change
their views concerning monetary policy. In his article
"The Monetarist Controversy, or Should We Forsake
Stabilization Policies?" Franco Modigliani, who is a
leading non-monetarist economist concedes that the debate
is no longer about whether or not monetary policy was
an effective tool. The debate is now more concentrated
on the issue of whether or not the economy can be
stabilized and if so, "should the government be trusted
with the necessary power."

5.

There is a belief on the part of some economists that
monetary policy is nothing more than an extension of
public finance where inflated money serves as a tax.
Interest collected through the sale of government
securities is eventually piped back into the Treasury
and used for public policy objectives.

6.

Dallas Batten and Daniel Thornton discover three major
criticisms of A-J that have been levied over the years
and they respond to them, successfully, in "The Monetary
Fiscal Policy Debate and the Anderson-Jordan Equation."
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review. (October 1986)

7.

from Friedman, Milton and Anna Schwartz. Monetary
Statistics of the United States. New York. Columbia
University Press. for the National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1970.

8.

The Federal Reserve cites recent financial innovations as
having a blurring affect on the definition of money and
have made the Ml and M2 aggregates more difficult to
achieve. This is discussed in detail by Anthony Solomon
in "Financial Innovation and Monetary Policy," in the
1981 Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York.
57

58

9.

from "Monetary and Fiscal Actions: A Test of Their
Relative Importance in Economic Stabilization." Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review (November, 1968), 11-24.

10.

Statistical tables and figures are derived directly
from Micro TSP.

11. For a discussion of the F-test on the ratio of variances,
see Pfaffenberger and Patterson 560-2.
12.

Data is compiled from U.S. Department of Commerce.
Bureau of Economic Analysis. Business Statistics.

13.

from "Counter Revolution in Monetary Theory" by
Milton Friedman.

14.

This is the formula for calculating our test statistic:
F = (SSRr/SSRy - 1) (N - Ku - 1/q)
Where SSRr is the sum of squared residuals of the
restricted regression, SSRU is the sum of squared
residuals in the unrestricted regression, N is the number
of observations, Ku is the number of right side variables
in the unrestricted regression, and q is the number of
restrictions (3, in our model). This test statistic is
distributed as an F with q degrees of freedom in the
numerator and N-Ku-1 degrees of freedom in the
denominator.
Inserting values into our equation, we
calculate our test statistic to be 1.6404085 (Newbold
and Bos 90-1).

15.

The existence of autocorrelation within a classical
linear regression has important consequences for the
model
since
a
classical
model
assumes
that
autocorrelation does not exist.
The problem with
estimating a linear ordinary least squares model where
autocorrelation exists is that the coefficient is no
longer the Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE). It is
still linear and unbiased but it is no longer efficient
(minimum variance). This can affect our treatment of
coefficients in that we may tend to call them
insignificant when in fact they are significant (Gujarati
362-63). That does not appear to be a problem in this
model, but we must still test for autocorrelation.

16.

R2 is a measure of "goodness of fit." It is defined as
the Explained Sum of Squares divided by the Total Sum of
Squares. This ratio tells us how much variation in the
dependent variable (DGNP) is explained by our regression.
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As most econometrics experts will agree, falling in love
with R2 is a dangerous proposition. A low R2 value does
not always mean that the regression is ineffective nor
does a high one mean that the model is exceptional. It
is merely a measure which can help to identify the
explanatory power of the model (Newbold and Bos 61).
17.

For a discussion of Theil's U test see Newbold and Bos
(449-51).

18.

Because of its similarity to monetarism in this respect,
The Rational Expectations Hypothesis is sometimes
considered a branch of monetarism, and not totally nonmonetarist. Furthermore, monetarists and Rational
Expectationalists see economic "fine-tuning" as the
introduction of additional uncertainty into an economy
where a degree of uncertainty already exists.
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